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Foreword 
The academy programme was launched in 2000 to turn around failing schools that served students from 
some of the nation’s poorest communities. By assisting these schools with the support of philanthropic, 
educational and business partners, the intention was to improve the lives of young people from the least 
privileged backgrounds. 
 
There are now over 7,500 academies in England, more than a third of all schools. In the secondary 
sector, academies and free schools comprise the vast majority of schools. Of these, about two thirds are 
schools, often among the more successful, that have ‘converted’ to gain academy status. The remaining 
third are ‘sponsored’ academies, which conform more to the original purpose of the academy project: to 
improve the fortunes of the UK’s most under-performing schools. 
 
The Sutton Trust’s Chain Effects series has been crucial in drawing attention to how the sponsored 
academies programme has served the interests of disadvantaged pupils across the country. It specifically 
looks at academies in ‘chains’, who share a sponsor, the government’s preferred model. Since the first 
edition in 2014, it has posed the question of whether sponsors are actually having a positive effect on 
the schools in their chains. 
 
With increased political attention to the topic, it is a natural time to take stock of the academies 
programme, its strengths, and its weaknesses. This, the final edition in the current series, gives an 
overview of academies policy to date, and its future direction. We have consistently highlighted that 
while many of these chains have had a profound impact on the schools they have taken over, many 
others continue to lag behind national averages. This year’s report is no different. Too many chain 
sponsors, despite several years in charge of their schools, continue to struggle to improve the outcomes 
of their most disadvantaged students. 
 
This issue is particularly crucial, as our research earlier this year has shown, academy chains now 
dominate the opening of new free schools, the government’s flagship school model. This raises real 
issues about the capacity of academy and free schools policy to deliver on lofty ambitions. If we are to 
give every pupil the best chance of a good education, we need a much greater consistency in school 
quality. In order to achieve this, it is essential that we see better exchange of information and practice 
from the most successful chains, to those who continue to perform poorly. 
 
Our Chain Effects reports have helped to create a new transparency around academy chains, and this 
year’s report provides a fitting overview. I am extremely grateful to Professors Merryn Hutchings and 
Becky Francis for all their work on the Chain Effects series over the past five years. 
 
Sir Peter Lampl 
Founder of the Sutton Trust and Chairman of the Education Endowment Foundation 
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Executive summary  
Sponsor-led academies have been promoted by successive governments as a way to improve the 
educational achievement of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. As the academies 
programme has developed, policymakers have increasingly seen academy chains, and especially multi-
academy trusts (MATs) as the best way of working to improve the performance of previously struggling 
schools and the educational outcomes of their often disadvantaged pupils. While the DfE now reports 
annually on MAT performance, a welcome development, there has been less attention to outcomes for 
disadvantaged pupils, the original focus of the sponsored academies programme. 
 
The Chain Effects annual reports address this gap, and remain the only analysis of the effectiveness of 
this policy strategy in impacting positively on the attainment of disadvantaged young people. This, the 
fifth and final report in the series, uses 2017 Key Stage 4 exam results and reviews findings over the 
five years.  
 
We include chains in our analysis only if they had at least three academies in 2017, and at least two 
secondary sponsored academies for a three-year period from September 2013. Academies are only 
included if they have been with the same sponsor since September 2014, so that there has been time 
for the sponsor to have some impact on performance. The report reviews outcomes for disadvantaged 
secondary pupils across a range of measures including Progress 8 and Attainment 8.  
 
The analysis reveals: 
 
• There continues to be very significant variation in outcomes for disadvantaged pupils, both between 
and within chains. In 2017, disadvantaged pupils in 12 out of 58 chains had attainment above the 
national average for disadvantaged pupils in all mainstream schools, including three chains which 
were substantially above that average. However, 38 of the 58 had attainment below the mainstream 
average, including 8 which were well below average.  
 
• This diversity, and the larger group that are lower performing, reflects our consistent findings. It is 
also important to note that this mainstream average for disadvantaged pupils is precisely what the 
sponsored academies programme was envisaged to outperform. 
 
• The five year analysis shows that there has been only limited change in the overall ranking of the 
chains in the analysis. The same small group of chains consistently outperform the national average 
for disadvantaged pupils, while another small group of chains remain at the bottom of the table 
each year, and there is little to suggest that the Regional Schools Commissioners are having any 
success in bringing about improvement in these chains. A small number of chains have shown 
consistent year on year improvement in the ranking, demonstrating that change is possible, while 
some others have fallen or fluctuated. 
 
• The chains that have joined the analysis group after the first year (when their academies first met 
the criteria above) have performed less well than on their first year of entry than those already in 
the group, with almost 8 out of 10 having below average results. This suggests both that it may take 
more than three years to bring about improvement in an under-performing school, and also that it 
takes time for a new academy chain to develop effective strategies for improving schools. There is 
little evidence of effective sharing of knowledge between more and less effective chains – though 
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when this does take place (as in the case of Outwood Grange and SPTA/Delta), improvement in 
results follows.  
 
• Those chains that were most successful with disadvantaged pupils also tended to be successful 
with their more affluent pupils, while less successful chains tended to have poor results for both 
groups.  
 
• The five-year analysis shows that, in comparison to the national pattern, the overall performance of 
disadvantaged pupils in sponsored academies in our analysis worsened slightly from 2013 to 2016, 
but is now recovering. This may be because the move to a more academic curriculum has been a 
major shift in focus for sponsored academies, many of which previously entered their students for 
a wide range of vocational qualifications. This change in focus has had implications for staffing and 
resources, and has taken place at a time when schools have suffered from falling budgets.  
 
• In the last two years the sponsored academies in our analysis have performed very much better 
against the floor standard. The change from a standard based on attainment to one based on pupil 
progress has clearly been beneficial for this group. Indeed, considering only the 26 chains that have 
been consistently part of the analysis, they had a smaller percentage of schools below the floor 
standard than was the case nationally.  Many of their pupils enter with low attainment, and despite 
good progress through secondary, do not attain well at GCSE.  
 
• Chains have responded in different ways to the new accountability measures, with some prioritising 
entry in all English Baccalaureate (EBacc) subjects, while others have focused on achieving good 
Attainment 8 and Progress 8 results without filling all the EBacc slots. This can reflect not entering 
pupils for languages. Previous research evidence has suggested that disadvantaged pupils in schools 
that have made the change to EBacc subjects very early were more likely to achieve English and 
maths GCSEs and to progress in education or employment. However, this pattern is not immediately 
in evidence among the academy chains; high EBacc entry is not related to improvement in the 
percentage achieving English and maths.  
 
• The numbers of disadvantaged pupils being entered for EBacc, compared to those achieving this 
collection of GCSE passes, is a cause for concern in many chains. Research evidence supports the 
importance of credentials in these subjects for future access to professional routes and careers, yet 
failure magnifies disadvantage for these pupils, and these factors must be carefully balanced in 
exam entry. 
 
• Over the last year, re-brokering academies has become a more standard practice, and the early 
results show that this may be effective. However, there is much still to do to ensure that the promise 
of the policy programme is realised in improving the educational experiences and outcomes for 
disadvantaged children. 
 
The 2017 results suggest that overall, sponsored academy chains are beginning to improve in relation 
to national figures. It is important that they have a period of stability to bed in the curriculum changes 
that they have had to make, and that during this period they have sufficient funding to do this. But it 
remains the case that there is a huge disparity among the chains. A small number continue to achieve 
impressive outcomes for their disadvantaged students against a range of measures, demonstrating the 
transformational impact on life chances that can be made. 
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However, a larger group of low-performing chains are achieving results that are not improving and may 
be harming the prospects of their disadvantaged students. There is little evidence that sufficient action 
is being taken to enable these chains to improve, or that the considerable knowledge base about how to 
improve struggling schools is being effectively passed on to new and underperforming chains. We repeat 
our call for further analysis and learning from successful chains (and other successful groups of schools), 
and for opportunities to be created for school groups to learn from each other.   
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Recommendations  
To maintain the impetus for improvement:  
 
1. Regional Schools Commissioners (RSCs) must act more firmly with chains that do not 
deliver improvement over time, in order to ensure that pupils’ life chances are being supported 
rather than harmed. To this end, the government must recognise the challenge of limited 
capacity in the system and allow RSCs to draw on all providers with good track records of 
successful public education delivery, including, where appropriate, successful local authorities. 
 
2. Ofsted should be empowered to undertake formal inspections of academy chains, and to 
make judgements on their provision, based on clear criteria. This goes significantly further than 
the summary evaluations currently being developed. We also suggest that the long-term 
underperformance of some chains may indicate the limited capacity of the present system – 
including the RSC structure, and availability of high quality sponsorship – to realise necessary 
change. It may be necessary to re-visit the present unsustainable complexity of the ‘middle tier’, 
in order to better support holistic system improvement. 
 
3. The Government, along with the National and Regional Schools Commissioners should do 
more to create mechanisms to ensure the spread of good practice from the best academy 
chains to the rest. The successes of many academy chains in effectively supporting pupils with 
low prior attainment should be celebrated and used as a resource for the rest of the system.  
This could include commissioning robust research on governance, structural arrangements, 
leadership, and teaching practice in chains that are providing transformational outcomes to their 
disadvantaged students, to analyse what enables them to succeed. 
 
To support pupil-level attainment: 
 
4. Sponsors and schools should make full use of the body of evidence on what works to 
improve pupil outcomes. For schools themselves, there is growing evidence on the most 
effective strategies for school improvement, including the Sutton Trust/Education Endowment 
Foundation (EEF) Teaching and Learning Toolkit, which focuses on effective strategies to 
improve results for disadvantaged students.  
 
5. There should be continued efforts to increase teacher supply in academic subjects where 
there are currently shortages, and strategies should be devised to ensure that struggling schools 
are able to recruit subject specialists. 
 
6. Research should be commissioned to determine whether or not the increase in the 
proportion of pupils entering all EBacc subjects is resulting in some pupils failing (gaining 
less than a standard pass) in multiple subjects. The target of 90% of pupils entering EBacc 
by 2025 should be reviewed in the light of this evidence. In the meantime, schools should 
reflect on their subject entry and outcome rates for disadvantaged pupils, and ensure that their 
practices are serving the best interests of the young people concerned. 
 
7. The government should recognise that schools alone cannot solve the challenges of social 
inequality; especially not as gaps widen for families. There needs to be recognition that schools 
are increasingly being expected to compensate other gaps in social provision, and that 
educational improvement and narrowing of gaps is hampered in these circumstances. 
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1. Introduction  
Within the space of a few years, academy schools spread from being a bespoke intervention to 
representing the vast majority of secondary schools, and a growing proportion of primaries. The 
programme was originally aimed at transforming the lives of disadvantaged pupils.1 So has it worked? 
The Chain Effects series of reports2 has aimed to analyse the impact of academy chains on disadvantaged 
pupils in sponsored academies.3 This is the fifth and final report in the series, and reviews findings over 
the last four years as well as presenting the 2017 data. 
 
When we started in 2013, there were no published tables of chains’ performance. Since then both DfE 
and the Education Policy Institute have produced such tables, but ours remains the only analysis with 
a specific focus on disadvantaged pupils in sponsored academies.4 Disadvantaged pupils in England 
consistently achieve less well than their more affluent peers. In 2017, just 46.4% of disadvantaged 
pupils attained Grade 4 or better in both English and mathematics GCSEs, compared with 72% of more 
affluent pupils. This gap has narrowed slightly; in 2011 the gap was 28.5%, whereas in 2017 it was 
25.6%. A similar narrowing is shown in the DfE’s disadvantage gap index.5 
 
There is a gap in attainment between disadvantaged pupils and their peers on entry to school and this 
widens through the years of schooling. While many factors both in and outside of the classroom 
contribute to this gap (see for example, the Sutton Trust’s Parent Power reports6), the government focus 
has been on the role of schools, and the creation of sponsored academies was one strategy to raise 
disadvantaged pupils’ attainment.  
 
The Chain Effects reports refer to chains of academies rather than multi-academy trusts (MATs). We use 
chain to mean a group of at least three academies with the same sponsor. Such groupings are not 
necessarily synonymous with MATs. Some chains include more than one MAT, and some MATs comprise 
only a single school. 
                                                
1 This intention was embedded at the start of the programme, which focused on revitalising schools in high-deprivation areas; 
but was also regularly reiterated by the DfE throughout the programme’s expansion (see for analysis Academies Commission, 
2013; Francis, 2018). 
2 Hutchings, Francis & De Vries, 2014; Hutchings, Francis & Kirby, 2015; Hutchings, Francis & Kirby, 2016, Hutchings & 
Francis, 2017. 
3 Disadvantaged pupils are those who have been eligible for Free School Meals at any time during the last 6 years, and those in 
care.  
4 e.g. DfE, 2018a, Andrews, 2018a, Andrews et al 2017. 
5 DfE 2018b. 
6 Francis & Hutchings, 2013; Montacute & Cullinane, 2018. 
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2. Policy background  
 
Origin and development of the academies programme   
 
The academies programme was initiated by the Labour Government in 2000, with the opening of the 
first ‘City Academies’ in 2002. These academies replaced secondary schools located in areas of social 
deprivation with a history of underperformance. Each academy was sponsored by a philanthropist or 
business partner, keen to make a difference to the lives of poor children and young people in deprived 
areas. The ambitious vision and business acumen of the sponsor were seen as key in establishing an 
ambitious new school. The new academies had start-up funds and freedoms to vary the curriculum, 
school year, staff pay and conditions of service.7 
 
As the programme grew, a wider range of sponsors were involved (including universities, charities and 
even schools) and start-up funding was abolished. Nevertheless, the continued commitment to 
resourcing struggling schools in areas of social deprivation as a means to address social justice was 
clear.8 By 2010, when the Coalition government was elected, the number of sponsor-led academies had 
increased to 203, still comprising a bespoke, albeit significant, policy experiment. 
 
This focus on revitalising England’s lowest performing schools was diluted with the Coalition’s drive to 
turn many of the most successful schools into academies through its ‘conversion’ programme. 9 The 
increased focus on school autonomy arguably trumped the original promotion of social redistribution, as 
it was now many of the best schools – where more advantaged children tend to be concentrated – that 
gained as a result of generous funding arrangements and autonomy.10 The academy programme had 
previously been limited to secondary schools, but now primary and special schools could also become 
academies. In addition, new schools have to be ‘free schools’ – which are academies under a different 
label.11 Nevertheless, the Coalition simultaneously enacted its pledge to maintain and significantly 
develop the sponsored academy programme; schools identified as underperforming or ‘failing’ had to 
become academies. And the original impetus to improve the life chances of disadvantaged pupils 
remained the articulated rationale for this approach.12  
 
Subsequently, the Conservative government (elected in 2015) set out its intention to make all schools 
in England become academies, but this was dropped in the face of opposition.  However, measures to 
increase the rate of conversion were incorporated in the 2016 Education and Adoption Act. 
 
Since then, academisation has been less prominent in the political agenda, but the number of both 
sponsored and converter academies has continued to rise (see Figure 1). Some 66% of secondary 
schools and 29% of primary schools were academies by August 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Academies Commission, 2013, p.21-22. 
8 Adonis, 2012; Mahony & Hextall, 2012. 
9 Academies Act, 2010. Initially, only school graded by Ofsted as Outstanding could convert, but from April 2011, all schools 
‘performing well’ could apply. 
10 Francis, 2010; Academies Commission, 2013. 
11 Around four out of five of the Free Schools created since 2015 have been created by academy trusts, Garry et al, 2018. 
12 See DfE, 2014b.  
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Figure 1: The growth in numbers of academies 2002-18 
 
 
 
Source: DfE 2018c. The chart shows the dates of opening of all academies listed in August 2018.  
 
 
Sponsors, and the development of academy chains and trusts 
 
The early academies were to be sponsored by businesses, churches or other faith groups, voluntary 
bodies or individuals who would contribute £2 million, with the rest of the funding coming from the 
Department. They would be able to name the academy after themselves, and dictate the curriculum.  
Difficulties in finding sponsors meant that the financial contribution was reduced, and there was less 
focus on individual business people and philanthropists as potential sponsors; substantial organisations 
such as universities, charities and even some local authorities were encouraged to set up academies. 
Limited sponsor capacity and educational expertise was thus established as an issue very early on.13 
 
Relatively early in the academies programme it became apparent that ‘stand-alone’ academies – those 
single schools with an individual sponsor – showed mixed success and were more likely to achieve poor 
outcomes. There was a risk of isolation impacting detrimentally on practice. The potential benefits of 
sponsor organisations operating as ‘chains’ (with a central organisation sponsoring and applying their 
model to more than one school) were increasingly identified.14 These organisations, often with 
substantial existing infrastructure and resources, were seen as bringing expertise and resource to 
sponsorship, and mitigating some of the risks associated with individual sponsors. Sponsored academy 
chains were a lynchpin of Coalition academies policy, with encouragement to existing sponsors to take 
on more schools, and later through the encouragement of school-led sponsorship.15  
                                                
13 Hill, 2010. 
14 Hill, 2010; Hill et al, 2012; DfE, 2012. 
15 See e.g. DfE, 2010. 
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Some converter academies have joined chains which originally consisted entirely of sponsored 
academies. Other converters have grouped together in multi-academy trusts. Table 1 shows the position 
in August 2018, when 70% of all academies were in trusts of three or more schools. This percentage 
has increased from 55% two years earlier and only 35% in 2010. The number of stand-alone academies 
has fallen in the last two years, but over half the trusts still consist of a single academy. 
 
Table 1: Academies in trusts and size of trusts 
 
Trust size Academies % Academies Trusts % Trusts 
1 1,596 21.4% 1,596 59.6% 
2 612 8.2% 306 11.4% 
3-5 1,746 23.4% 466 17.4% 
6-10 1,515 20.3% 204 7.6% 
11-20 993 13.3% 75 2.8% 
21-30 459 6.1% 18 0.7% 
31-40 263 3.5% 8 0.3% 
41+ 291 3.9% 6 0.2% 
Total 7,475 100% 2,679 100% 
 
Source: DFE, 2018c.  
 
Many chains were actively encouraged to expand rapidly in the early years of the Coalition government, 
as a result of the vast increase in numbers of academies. However, capacity challenges became evident 
around 2014, with some chains prevented from further expansion and other having academies removed 
because they had not improved. The size and number of larger chains has shown little change in the 
last few years, but there has been a substantial increase in the number of chains with 3 or more schools 
(Table 1 shows there were 777 in August 2018; in June 2014 there were just 192). 
 
 
Academy organisation and infrastructure 
 
As the number of academies has increased, the arrangements to support them have also developed. The 
government promoted the multi-academy trust (MAT) as the best structure for academy chains, and now 
all academies are in MATs or single academy trusts. Academy trusts are accountable for the performance 
of each of their academies.  
 
In 2014, eight Regional Schools Commissioners were appointed, each supported and advised by a 
Headteacher Board and line managed by the National Schools Commissioner. Their remit currently 
includes taking decisions on the creation of new converter and sponsored academies, matching schools 
to sponsors; ensuring there are enough high quality sponsors to meet local need; and monitoring 
academy and maintained school performance and where necessary, intervening.16  
 
One form of intervention for under-performing academies is to ‘re-broker’ them – that is, move them to 
another trust. The first re-brokerage was in 2012. The MAT taking on the re-brokered academy receives 
a grant sum. Between March 2013 and March 2018, 2.4% of all academies have moved from one trust 
to another with a payment involved (presumably indicating re-brokering). A further 5.8% have changed 
                                                
16 Foster & Long, 2017. 
11 
 
trusts without payment. The percentage moving trusts has increased each year to 3.3% in 2017-18.17 
Two academies have each changed trust twice within three years.18 
 
 
Impact of academisation on attainment 
 
It is not possible to say with any accuracy how attainment has changed over time, because the 
examinations pupils take, the way they are graded, and the key performance measures for schools have 
changed. This means that the main way of assessing changes in performance is by comparing attainment 
between groups of schools at different dates. Inevitably this is to some extent measuring which schools 
have adapted most quickly to the new measures in place.  
 
Overall, studies of the impact of the academies programme show little difference between the 
performance of academies and local authority maintained schools.19 However, the various league tables 
that have been produced all indicate that some academy trusts perform better than others.20 The 
Education Policy Institute recently argued that ‘what matters most is being in a high performing school 
group, not being in an academy rather than a local authority maintained school or vice-versa.21 Another 
indication of differences between academy trusts is the re-brokering programme. If academies improve 
when they are moved to other trusts, this suggests that some factor in the working of the trust may be 
responsible for the improvement. It is as yet early days to investigate this but there are indications that 
moving schools between trusts does appear to be associated with some positive outcomes.22    
It remains a concern that some under-performing schools have not improved despite becoming 
academies. Ofsted have drawn attention to a group of 140 schools that have repeatedly been identified 
in inspections as requiring improvement, but have not improved. Of these, 52 schools are currently 
academies and 29 of these are in MATs. A common factor among these schools is that they have a high 
percentage of disadvantaged pupils.23 
 
Some studies have focused particularly on whether the sponsored academy programme, in which under-
performing schools become academies, has been successful in improving the performance of those 
schools. Analysis undertaken by LSE researchers has shown that the pre-2010 sponsored academies 
have improved, but that the impact on post-2010 sponsored and converter academies has been very 
limited.24 The fact that some academies continue to underperform (and that re-brokering is now routine) 
makes it clear that academisation is not the panacea that it was intended to be.  
 
Our Chain Effects series of reports has focused on the impact of academisation on disadvantaged pupils 
in sponsored academies – the main target group of the original programme. We have found that 
government claims that academisation has transformed the performance of disadvantaged pupils are 
only true for a small number of academy trusts.25 Our findings over the five years are set out in detail 
later in this report. 
 
                                                
17 DfE, 2018d.  
18 Carter, 2017. 
19 e.g. Andrews, 2018. 
20 e.g. DfE, 2018a; Andrews et al, 2017; Andrews 2018a. 
21 Andrews, 2018a, p.9.  
22 Andrews, 2018b. 
23 Ofsted, 2017; Spielman, 2018a. 
24 Andrews et al, 2017. 
25 e.g. DfE, 2013, 2014b, 2015. 
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Other current issues 
 
Sponsors: number and quality 
 
The DfE has reported that there is a risk of there being an insufficient number of high quality sponsors 
and MATs available to support underperforming schools.26 A DfE survey in 2016 found limited capacity 
to support additional schools over the next three years, and in January 2018, 95 sponsors had asked 
not to take on more schools because they lacked capacity, and a further 12 sponsors had been ‘paused’ 
because of educational, financial or governance concerns. This shortage affects some regions more than 
others.27  
 
The difficulty in finding sponsors has increased the time it takes between being judged Inadequate and 
opening as an academy. NAO report an average wait of 18 months. Another factor here is the 
unwillingness of trusts to take on certain schools, for example, those with severe problems, those that 
are geographically isolated, and those with financial issues such as PFI contracts. One school has waited 
seven years for a trust to accept it, and four others have waited three years. In each case the delay has 
been caused by PFI contracts.28 Ironically, given the original intention of the academies programme, 
many of these ‘SNOWs’ (Schools No-one Wants) are in areas of social deprivation.29  
 
The quality of sponsors is also an issue. In the light of the findings of our earlier reports, we have 
consistently recommended that Ofsted should be empowered to undertake formal inspections of 
academy chains. Similar calls have come from the Ofsted Chief Inspector Amanda Spielman and her 
predecessor Sir Michael Wilshaw, and from the Education Select Committee.30 Yet this has not 
happened, and remains an ongoing concern. Amanda Spielman, Chief Inspector, recently described this 
situation as ‘untenable’, arguing that much decision-making now sits at the level of the trust, not just 
on financial and employment matters, but in determining curriculum, teaching and assessment.31 We 
therefore welcome Ofsted’s recent announcement that their inspections of academies within a MAT will 
be followed by a visit to the MAT Head office.32 
 
In a similar vein, Sir David Carter, the then National Schools Commissioner, proposed a system of ‘health 
checks’ for MATs. These have been piloted as a system of peer review in which the Chief Executive of a 
large MAT visits a smaller MAT for three days to give advice. This could result in welcome sharing of 
information but does not necessarily provide a check on quality.  
 
MAT strategies for success 
 
The current accountability structures and sanctions inevitably encourage schools to try and maximise 
their results, and it has been shown that some of the strategies used are dubious.33 There are concerns 
that some academy trusts may be making more use than other schools of strategies such as ‘off-rolling’ 
students before their GCSE exams, and entering large numbers of pupils for qualifications which are 
perceived to be easier.34 In that the schools in academy trusts serve a disproportionate number of 
                                                
26 DfE, 2018e.  
27 NAO, 2018. 
28 Dickens, 2018a. 
29 Francis 2018.  
30 e.g. Education Select Committee 2015, 2017. Wilshaw 2014, 2016. The Public Accounts committee (2015) and the National 
Audit Office (2014) have also commented on this issue. 
31 Spielman, 2018a. 
32 Harford, 2018. 
33 Hutchings, 2015.  
34 See e.g. Mansell, 2018, Nye, 2018a, Nye & Thomson, 2018. 
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disadvantaged pupils, any malpractice by trusts will disproportionately impact on disadvantaged pupils. 
Such strategies are discussed further in Section 6.  
 
Academy autonomy 
 
Increasing school autonomy was a key part of the original rationale for academisation, in line with the 
OECD finding that in countries where schools have greater autonomy over what is taught and how 
students are assessed, students tend to perform better.35 The government stresses that academies enjoy 
greater autonomy than other schools, and thus teachers and headteachers have more control: ‘decision-
making has truly been localised’.36  The original intention here was to give academies, generally located 
in deprived areas, greater freedom to adopt strategies to meet the needs of their pupils.  
 
However, many MATs now require their academies to adopt a prescribed curriculum and practices, and 
the academies thus have little or no autonomy.37 Sir David Carter, in an interview with Schools Week, 
acknowledged that this reduces autonomy at school level: ‘A lot of CEOs have woken up to the reality 
that the strongest practice in a trust needs to be trust-wide – by definition, that gets in the way of 
autonomy. The proof is in outcomes.’38 Given the OECD conclusion that greater autonomy at school level 
results in better performance, it is a concern that that so many disadvantaged pupils are in schools with 
little or no autonomy. This loss of autonomy arises from the legal structure of MATs. Schools in MATs 
no longer exist as legal entities and cannot decide to leave the MAT.39 Amanda Spielman, Chief 
Inspector, has argued that this is not widely understood.40 
 
Local democracy  
 
A wider issue is that academisation has involved a vast reduction in local democratic decision-making 
about education. Academy trusts are appointed rather than elected. Whereas in the past a low-income 
parent had the opportunity to stand as a school governor, or as a local councillor, they are much less 
likely to be appointed as trustees of a MAT.41 
 
 
Current policy directions 
 
In terms of present policy, it seems fair to say there is a hiatus. One of the authors of this report, in 
sketching the ‘five phases of the academies programme’, has characterised the phase since 2017 as 
‘an open chapter’.42 The last policy Green Paper (2017) charted a new focus on grammar schools: 
thankfully this approach43 has never come to parliament. But in the meantime, full academisation has 
diminished as an overt policy aim and agenda – even as the numbers continue to rise. The absence of 
new regulation or mandate was initially presented as an intentional period of calm and stability. Yet it 
leaves many issues unresolved – not least the ongoing promulgation of a dual system of responsibility 
for English state schooling (Local Authorities and Regional Schools Commissioners); and the inter-woven 
                                                
35 e.g. OECD, 2011. 
36 Nick Gibb, School Standards Minister, 2017. 
37 West and Wolfe, 2018. 
38 Dickens, 2018b.  
39 West and Wolfe, 2018. 
40 Spielman 2018b. 
41 A further issue here is the dual system of academies and local authority maintained schools, with different rules governing each 
sector. One instance where this is problematic is the planning of school places. Local authorities have a legal duty to ensure 
that sufficient schools are available in the area, but have no legal powers to set up new schools to meet local needs, or control 
over the admissions process in academies (West and Wolfe, 2018).  
42 Francis 2018 
43 e.g. Macmillan, 2018; Cullinane, 2016. 
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complexity for academies and MATs of accountability to both RSCs and to Ofsted.44 And during this 
period of hiatus, within which a series of Secretaries of State for Education have come and gone, the 
policy narrative of academies’ transformative potential for the educational outcomes of young people 
from disadvantaged backgrounds appears to have dissipated.45  
 
However, academies are prominent in the policies put forward by the Labour opposition. In her speech 
to the 2018 National conference, Angela Rayner, Shadow Education Secretary, pledged that Labour 
would end the forced conversion of local schools to academies and scrap the free school programme.46 
Local authorities would be given powers over admissions for all schools in their areas, and would be able 
to build new schools or force existing academies to expand. They would also be able to take back ‘failing’ 
academies. Parents and local communities would have a key role in democratic decision-making about 
education in their areas. These proposals address the issues of local democracy identified above. 
However, they do not address the issue that concerns us in this report: the role of sponsored academies 
in improving the educational outcomes of disadvantaged pupils. This does not currently feature strongly 
in the agenda of either party.  
 
So, when better to take stock of the original intentions of the programme, and assess its impact on 
pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds? This final report in the Chain Effects series will analyse the 
most recent data, and also provide an over-arching analysis, drawing conclusions from our five reports. 
                                                
44 See Education Select Committee, 2015.  
45 Indeed, our last Chain Effects report (2017) called for this impetus not to be forgotten. 
46 Rayner, 2018. 
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3. Research design  
The academies included in the analysis 
 
This research is primarily concerned with outcomes for disadvantaged pupils in sponsored academies in 
academy chains.47 Our main focus over the five years 2013-17 has been secondary and all-age sponsored 
academies with Key Stage 4 (KS4) results. In this report we draw together findings from the five years 
in which we have conducted this analysis. 
 
In our last report we also included an analysis of the 2016 Key Stage 2 (KS2) results in primary and 
all-age academies, and reviewed outcomes for converter academies in the chains in our analysis groups.48  
These findings are briefly summarised in this report. 
 
 
Key Stage 4 analysis group 
 
Each year we have included as chains all instances where one sponsor is listed for three or more 
academies (sponsored or converter). However, we acknowledge that in some cases these are not 
organised as multi-academy trusts (MATs), and that in practice some schools have multiple sponsors; 
thus, the organisations we include may not all consider themselves to be chains, and may not have 
primary responsibility for the schools listed against them.49  
 
Our KS4 analysis group includes only chains with at least two secondary or all-age sponsored academies 
which have consistently been part of the same chain for three academic years, and which had pupils 
taking GCSE exams in each of those years. While this inevitably limits the number of academies and 
chains included in the analysis, we have done this because the majority of pupils will have undertaken 
at least the most recent three years of their education within the chain, and so it seems reasonable to 
relate their outcomes and progress to the chain.50  
 
We have not included free schools in our analyses, because the published data has only recently 
indicated which free schools are included in MATs, and because even in 2017, only three free schools 
met our criterion of having GCSE results in three successive years. 
  
The number and size of the chains we have been able to include in the report has increased over the 
years in line with the increased number of sponsored academies.  
 
 Year GCSE exams taken 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of chains 31 34 39 48 58 
Number of academies 125 156 187 244 288 
 
                                                
47 All academies opened prior to September 2010 are classified as sponsored by the DfE; the majority of these were underperforming 
schools but a small number were City Technology Colleges, or were newly opened schools. Since September 2010, all the school 
that have become sponsored academies were identified as under-performing. 
48 We considered including the free schools in academy chains, but the majority are too new to have attainment data for the relevant 
years.  
49 For further discussion, see Hutchings, Francis & De Vries, 2014. 
50 The DfE now use this approach in their annual statistical release analysing the performance of MATs.  
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Just 26 chains have been included in all five reports. Five of the original chains no longer exist (some 
as a result of diocesan reorganisation, other have closed).  
 
The 58 chains included in the analysis of 2017 data are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Chains and number of academies included in the analysis of 2017 performance 
 
Chain 
No. of 
schools in 
the analysis 
Total 
academies in 
the chain 
June 2017 
 Chain 
No. of 
schools in 
the analysis 
Total 
academies in 
the chain 
June 2017 
Academies Enterprise 
Trust (AET) 
27 66  Inspiration Trust 2 9 
Academy 
Transformation Trust 
(ATT) 
6 24  
Kemnal Academy Trust, The 
(TKAT) 
3 40 
Aldridge Education 4 7  Landau Forte Charitable Trust 3 6 
ARK Schools 11 30  Leigh Academies Trust 3 14 
Aspirations 
Academies Trust 
(AAT) 
2 9  Mercers Company, The 2 3 
Bridgwater College 
Trust 
2 4  
Merchant Venturers, The 
Society of 
2 7 
Bright Futures 
Educational Trust 
2 7  Northern Education Trust 7 20 
Brook Learning Trust 2 3  Oasis Community Learning 14 45 
Brooke Weston Trust 4 9  Ormiston Academies Trust 24 31 
Cabot Learning 
Federation 
7 14  
Outwood Grange Academies 
Trust 
7 21 
Cambridge Meridian 
Academies Trust 
(CMAT) 
2 8  RSA Academies 2 5 
CfBT Education Trust 3 12  Sidney Stringer Academy Trust 2 4 
City of London 
Academies Trust 
3 4  Swale Academies Trust 2 9 
Creative Education 
Trust 
4 13  Tapton School Academy trust 2 8 
David Meller 2 4  The Co-operative Group 3 8 
David Ross Education 
Trust (DRET) 
5 32  
The Education Fellowship 
Trust 
4 12 
Delta Academies 
Trust 
7 40  
The Haberdashers' Livery 
Company 
4 5 
Diocese of Exeter 2 17  The Midland Academies Trust 2 4 
Diocese of London 2 12  
The Priory Federation of 
Academies Trust 
4 4 
Diocese of Oxford 3 28  The Redhill Academy Trust 2 7 
Diverse Academies 
Trust 
2 9  The Skinners' Company 3 5 
Dixons Academy 
Trust 
2 4  
Transforming Education in 
Norfolk (TEN Group) 
2 5 
E-ACT 11 24  Trust in Learning (Academies) 2 4 
Eastern Multi-
Academy Trust 
3 9  UCAT 3 6 
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Emmanuel Schools 
Foundation 
3 3  United Learning 25 44 
Fylde Coast Teaching 
School Ltd 
2 7  
University of Brighton 
(Hastings Academies Trust) 
2 15 
Grace Foundation 3 3  
Wakefield City Academies 
Trust 
2 21 
Greenwood 
Academies Trust 
7 30  White Rose Trust 3 3 
Harris Federation 14 32  Woodard Academies Trust 5 5 
 
Notes: This list uses sponsors as recorded on the DfE list published in June 2017.51 Some academies have since changed sponsor. 
One sponsor (Wakefield City Academies Trust) ceased to sponsor academies in autumn 2017.  
 
Table 2 lists sponsors in the form given on the DfE list of academies. But in the remainder of this report 
we have shortened these by removing words such as ‘Trust’, ‘Federation’, ‘Foundation’, ‘Group’ etc. 
Names of chains in which only two academies are included are italicised in the text of the report and 
on tables. On graphs, their names are in lower case.  
 
 
The data  
 
The 2017 data used in this report are derived from the School Performance Tables,52 produced by NFER 
for the Sutton Trust.53 Figures have been calculated for each chain in the analysis group. Where data for 
an academy has been suppressed because there are fewer than six pupils in a particular group, or 
because of low coverage, that academy has been omitted from the chain results.  
 
National changes to attainment data 
 
Over the five years in which we have produced Chain Effects reports, there have been major changes in 
the ways in which secondary school performance is measured. Whereas in 2013, the main accountability 
measure was the percentage of pupils achieving five A*-C grades including English and mathematics at 
GCSE, from 2016 the headline accountability measures became Attainment 8 and Progress 8, together 
with attainment in English and maths, and English Baccalaureate (EBacc) entry and achievement. 
Details of these measures are in Appendix A.54   
 
These new measures involve a greater focus on pupil progress, and an emphasis on a more academic 
curriculum. They also ensure that the achievements of all pupils are included in the measures by which 
a school is judged (both Attainment 8 and Progress 8 are based on averages), and thus reduce the 
incentive to focus on borderline pupils, which was a feature of previous measures.55  
 
As well as introducing new performance measures, GCSE exams in English and mathematics have been 
made more challenging, and in 2017 the system for grading these subjects at GCSE changed from A*-
G grades to 1-9, with 9 being the highest. Published figures show both ‘standard passes’ (at Grade 4 
and above, equivalent to passes at Grade C and above in the old system) and ‘strong passes’ (Grade 5 
                                                
51 DfE, 2017. 
52 DfE, 2018a. 
53 Attainment data from 2013, 2014 and 2015 was also derived from the School Performance Tables. The 2016 data was derived 
from the National Pupil Database by Education Datalab. 
54 A further accountability measure is destinations after Key Stage 4. 
55 Ball et al., 2012.  
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and above).56  Other subjects will be reformed to increase the level of challenge and will move to the 
new grading system by 2020.  
 
These changes mean that it is impossible to say how much a school (or academy chain) has improved 
its performance over the years. 
 
 
Limitations  
 
The main limitation of the Chain Effects reports is that only 46% of the sponsored academies that 
existed in June 2017 are included; the remainder had either not been academies for three years (22%), 
or were in MATs which did not meet the criteria set out Section 3.2 above (37%). Section 3 explained 
our rationale for including only those schools that have been in the same chain for three years. However, 
in most chains listed at KS4, all or a substantial majority of the secondary sponsored academies met 
our criteria for inclusion. Thus, our findings give a good picture of the performance of those chains. It 
is only in two rapidly growing chains that our findings give a partial picture of their success with 
disadvantaged pupils: Redhill (two out of six) and Outwood Grange (seven out of 13). 
 
Another limitation is that in this report, the unit of analysis is the academy chain. However, it should 
not be assumed that schools within each chain are similar to each other. There is considerable variability 
within chains in terms of their Ofsted outcomes and attainment.57 There is also wide variation in the 
characteristics of the intake of each academy and the attainment figures. These differences tend to 
reflect the different routes through which schools became sponsored academies; some of the original 
sponsored academies were private schools or former City Technology Colleges and some had been high-
attaining state schools but had chosen to become academies before conversion was possible. In some, 
but not all cases, these schools still have much higher attainment than the former ‘failing’ schools. 
Another historical difference is between academies that were former failing schools and academies that 
were created as new schools: for example, ARK has created a number of new sponsored academies 
(similar schools created now would be termed Free Schools). Where chains are relatively small, this can 
skew the overall attainment figures we are using. 
 
 
Structure of the report 
 
The next section reviews chain characteristics that may impact on attainment outcomes. Section 5 then 
focuses on pupil performance in 2017, and Section 6 considers how chains have performed over the 
five years of this analysis. 
  
                                                
56 Although the exam content has become more challenging, in 2017 the ‘standard’ pass (Grade 4 and above) was awarded to the 
same proportion of pupils achieved Grade C and above in the previous grading system. The ‘strong’ pass (Grade 5 and above) is 
designed to be a benchmark comparable with high performing education systems.  
57 See Nye, 2018b.  
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4. Chain characteristics that may impact on attainment  
A wide range of pupil characteristics impact on attainment. These include gender and ethnicity, socio-
economic and social class background (as indicated by wealth, level of parental education, and so on), 
and birth date within the school year.58 When comparing the attainment of pupils in different schools, 
pupil characteristics have been identified as having a key impact on attainment. It is important to note, 
however, that while pupils with certain characteristics tend to attain less well, this is not inevitable. 
Some schools ‘buck the trend’.  
 
The Chain Effects reports focus on disadvantage, because a key aspect of the creation of sponsored 
academies was the assumption that they would ‘break the cycle of disadvantage’.59 The attainment of 
disadvantaged pupils has been consistently lower than that of their peers, and their progress less rapid 
(Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Performance of disadvantaged and other pupils at KS4 in  
state-funded mainstream schools, 2017  
 
 Attainment 8 score 
Standard pass in both 
GCSE English and 
mathematics 
Progress 8 
Disadvantaged 38.6 46.4% -0.34 
Not disadvantaged 50.2 72.0% 0.12 
 
The proportion of disadvantaged pupils within the analysis group of chains varies considerably. 
Nationally, 27% of all KS4 pupils in state-funded mainstream schools were defined as ‘disadvantaged’ 
in 2017; the figures for the analysis group of chains varied from 18% to over 70%. This shows that, by 
and large, the sponsored academies within these chains were retaining their intended purpose of serving 
disproportionately disadvantaged demographics (including a few with more than double the national 
percentage of disadvantaged students).  
 
While disadvantage has a substantial effect on attainment figures, the strongest predictor of KS4 pupils’ 
attainment is their prior attainment, measured by their performance in the Key Stage 2 (KS2) national 
tests. The DfE statistics distinguish three groups of pupils; those whose attainment was average (that 
is, they achieved Level 4 in National Curriculum tests); below average, or low (achieved below Level 4) 
and above average, or high (achieved Level 5 or above). In 2017, 12% of pupils taking GCSE had low 
prior attainment and 40% had high prior attainment.  These three groups performed very differently at 
KS4 (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Performance of pupils at KS4 by prior attainment in  
state-funded mainstream schools, 2017  
 
KS2 attainment Attainment 8 score 
Standard pass in both GCSE English 
and mathematics 
Low 25.2 10.8% 
Average 41.1 55.5% 
High 60.5 92.8% 
                                                
58 For commentary on the impact of some of these factors on pupil attainment, see Lupton et al., 2009; Strand, 2014; Education 
Select Committee, 2014. 
59  See Blunkett, 2000. 
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Cleary there is some overlap between disadvantaged pupils and those with low prior attainment. 
Nationally, the disadvantaged group includes a disproportionate number of pupils with low prior 
attainment (though this is still only a quarter of all disadvantaged pupils).  
 
Figure 2 shows both the percentage of disadvantaged pupils and the percentage with low prior 
attainment in each chain in the analysis group. It shows that the chains face very different levels of 
challenge.  Most have more than the national average both of disadvantaged pupils, and of those with 
low prior attainment. Mercers is the only one that has less than the national average of pupils in both 
categories.  
 
Among the chains with the greatest levels of challenge, TEN has the highest percentage of pupils with 
low prior attainment, Fylde Coast the highest percentage of disadvantaged pupils, and Cooperative, 
White Rose and University of Brighton have high percentages in both groups. Among the larger chains, 
Oasis, E-ACT and ARK have the highest levels of challenge using these measures.60 
                                                
60 We recognise that pupil characteristics are not easily summed up in metrics; there is undoubtedly a difference in outlook and 
prospects between disadvantaged pupils living in a depressed area where long-term unemployment is endemic, and those living 
in a more affluent area where it is possible to get jobs. The challenges facing schools will differ in each case. We are not suggesting 
that all disadvantaged pupils, or all those with low prior attainment are the same. But we need to use definitions that enable us 
to distinguish between groups of pupils; recognising that this may over-simplify reality. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of pupils in analysis group academies in each chain who are disadvantaged, and percentage with low prior attainment, 
compared with the percentages in all mainstream state-funded schools  
 
 
 
Note that prior attainment figures are not available for all pupils. Nationally, almost 5% of KS4 pupils in mainstream secondary schools do not have prior attainment data.  
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Figure 2 shows that the pupil intake varies widely across the chains. But the pupil demographic of the 
large majority – with higher than average numbers of disadvantaged pupils and, especially, low prior 
attaining pupils, suggests that academy chains have largely retained their original focus on pupils 
needing additional help and resource, reflecting the original mission of the academies programme. In 
this sense, it is important to note that most chains face a greater level of challenge in terms of their 
intake than the mainstream state school average, and some a very much greater level.   
 
In our first report, we also reviewed characteristics of the chains that might potentially impact on their 
success. We found that chains that had grown very rapidly were less likely to do well, while those in 
London were more likely to have high attainment. Other research has suggested that chains focused in 
a limited geographical area are more successful.61 The chain characteristic that is perhaps the most 
important in relation to performance is their strategy for supporting school improvement. Our reports 
have emphasised the importance of sharing successful strategies rather than competing. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
61 DfE, 20I4a; Hill et al., 2012. 
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5. The performance of disadvantaged pupils in 2017 
 
This section below reviews the 2017 performance of disadvantaged pupils in the analysis group chains. 
 
Attainment 8 and Progress 8  
 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the performance of disadvantaged pupils in the analysis group chains 
in 2017, using Attainment 8 and Progress 8 figures It is important to note that the comparison is with 
the national figures for disadvantaged pupils in mainstream schools (represented by the axes on Figure 
3). But of course, the target should be to eliminate the gap between disadvantaged and other pupils. 
The national figures for all pupils in mainstream schools are 0.0 for Progress 8 and 47.4 for Attainment 
8. Only City of London and Diocese of London exceed these levels (and Harris almost does so). 
 
However, our main comparison is with national scores achieved by disadvantaged pupils. Half of the 
analysis group chains had above average Progress 8 scores, whereas less than a third have above average 
Attainment 8. This is a pattern we have found in each of our reports: pupil progress in sponsored 
academies is generally better in comparison to national figures than their level of attainment; this results 
from the larger numbers of pupils who did not achieve well at primary school.  
 
In comparison to last year, both the national and the chains’ Attainment 8 figures are about three 
percentage points lower as a result of the change to GCSE grades. Overall Figure 3 presents a very 
similar picture to the equivalent findings in our last report, and to graphs in previous reports where we 
have compared attainment and progress.  
 
Chains that do well on one measure tend to also do well on the other. But it is worth noting the cluster 
of chains where progress is above average but attainment has not yet reached that level.  Also noteworthy 
are the two chains where attainment is above average but progress below average (Haberdashers and 
Mercers). It is worrying that in almost half the chains, both measures are below the national average. 
Most concerning is the very poor performance of Wakefield and Midland. Wakefield schools were 
transferred to other sponsors during autumn 2017.  
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Figure 3: Disadvantaged pupils: Attainment 8 and Progress 8, 2017, compared with national figures for disadvantaged pupils  
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Percentage achieving passes in English and maths   
 
Attainment 8 is of interest because it represents the achievements of all pupils in a school, even when 
these are below ‘pass’ level. But what is more important to the individual pupil is whether they achieve 
at least Grade 4 in GCSE English and maths, as these are now required for entry to many courses, and 
often by employers; however, some require standard passes (Grades 9-4), while others have adopted the 
new benchmark, strong passes.    
 
The percentage of students achieving standard passes in both English and maths is also of interest 
because, unlike Progress 8 and Attainment 8, the same measure has been used over a number of years 
with only limited changes, and so we can review whether chains have succeeded in improving the 
performance of their disadvantaged pupils.62 Figure 4 compares the percentage of pupils achieving 
Grade C or above in 2015 with those achieving Grade 4 or above in 2017. We have used the same 
schools in each chain in each of these years. 
 
Figure 4 is arranged by the 2015 performance, and shows that more than half the chains had a higher 
percentage of pupils achieving this measure in 2017 than 2015, though in some cases the improvement 
was very small. The most notable improvement was made by Dixons. However, over a third of chains, 
including some which did well in 2015, had a lower percentage of pupils passing both English and 
maths in 2017. Possibly they had adapted less well to the demands of the reformed 2017 English and 
maths GCSEs. In 2015 18 of the chains exceeded the national percentage, but in 2017 only 11 did so.  
In 2017, in the vast majority of chains, less than half of disadvantaged pupils achieved this measure, 
which is of such importance for their future prospects.    
 
While Grade 4 and above is a standard pass equivalent to the old Grade C and above, the new government 
benchmark is much more challenging: the ‘strong’ pass at Grade 5 and above. In most chains, about 
20% fewer pupils achieved strong then standard passes, indicating how very much more challenging 
the new benchmark is. While raising standards is a laudable aim, it is debatable whether the best way 
to do this is to make a higher percentage of pupils come away with what they perceive to be a fail.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
62 English and maths GCSEs in 2017 were very much more challenging, 9-1 grades are used, but as the bottom of Grade C and of 
Grade 4 are equivalent, comparisons can be made with previous years.  There were also changes between 2015 and 2016. In 
2016, pupils could achieve the English component with A* to C in English language or literature. In 2015 pupils had to achieve 
an A* to C in English language, and have sat an English literature exam. The change means a higher proportion of pupils achieve 
the measure in 2016. Thus the improvement shown between 2015 and 2017 is not precise, but as the changes have been for 
all schools, it is possible to compare across chains. 
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Figure 4: Percentage of disadvantaged pupils in each chain achieving Grade C /4 or above in 
both English and maths, 2015 and 2017 
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English Baccalaureate 
 
The EBacc continues to be achieved by only a small minority of disadvantaged pupils nationally and in 
our analysis group. There is considerable variation across chains in the percentage of pupils entered for 
all EBacc subjects (Figure 5), which suggests that chains have different strategies in relation to this. 
The proportion of pupils entered for all EBacc subjects is a government accountability measure, and can 
clearly boost Attainment 8 scores, even if a standard or strong pass is not achieved. However, some 
chains appear to focus more on non-EBacc Attainment 8 slots.  For example, Outwood Grange and 
Grace, both of had more than the national average scores for disadvantaged pupils for both Progress 8 
and Attainment 8, entered only 19% and 10% respectively of disadvantaged pupils for all EBacc 
subjects – well below the national figure of 27% of disadvantaged pupils. The EBacc subject that attracts 
the fewest entries is languages, and this may relate in part to teacher shortages in languages.  
 
The proportion of those entered for all EBacc subjects who the achieved EBacc (with either strong or 
standard passes) varies hugely. As we said above, Outwood Grange entered only 19% of disadvantaged 
pupils, but 13% achieved standard passes (well above the average across the chains). In contrast, David 
Meller entered 36% in all EBacc subjects, with only 1.4% achieving a standard pass in all of them, and 
Greenwood entered almost half its disadvantaged pupils, with 8.5% achieving standard passes.  
 
Those entering larger numbers are responding to the government drive to raise EBacc entry rates. Their 
targets are that 75% of pupils should study and enter all EBacc subjects by 2022 and 90% by 2025.63 
To incentivise schools to provide a rigorous academic curriculum for all pupils, EBacc entry and EBacc 
average point score have joined the headline accountability measures. Many concerns have been voiced 
about this policy, with some arguing that the EBacc is not suitable for all pupils (particularly for some 
of those who are disadvantaged or have low prior attainment) both because they may lack aptitude for, 
or interest in, these subjects, and others concerned that the number of academic subjects in EBacc may 
stretch some pupils’ efforts too widely, and result in very low grades. It has been argued that it is 
inappropriate to enter pupils into exams which they are likely to fail to achieve grades that are of any 
value for their future education or employment. 
 
Some light is shed on this debate by a Sutton Trust investigation of a group of schools that responded 
very quickly to the introduction of EBacc, transforming their curriculum between 2012 and 2013, and 
dramatically increasing the numbers entering all EBacc subjects.64 This study showed that 
disadvantaged pupils benefited the most from these changes, with more of them achieving GCSEs at 
Grade C or above English and maths, more taking A levels and fewer dropping out of education. It would 
be of interest to repeat this analysis with schools that have increased EBacc entries more recently.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
63 DfE, 2018f. 
64 Allen & Thomson, 2016. 
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Figure 5: EBacc entries and achievement, disadvantaged pupils 2017  
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Reviewing the GSCE outcomes for Outwood Grange (entering only 28% of all pupils for EBacc) and 
David Meller and Greenwood (entering more than half their pupils for EBacc), around a quarter of the 
entries to EBacc subjects by all pupils resulted in a grade below C/4, whereas more than half the entries 
in the other two chains did so. This raises questions about the value of entering pupils into subjects in 
which they are unlikely to achieve the grades required for further study or for employment (we explore 
this point in the Discussion section). However, research using the National Pupil Database would shed 
more light on the outcomes for individual pupils, and for those who are disadvantaged. Similarly, there 
seems little to support the idea that those chains with high EBacc entry rates are necessarily improving 
disadvantaged pupils’ performance in English and maths. Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4 shows that 
most of those chains with a high level of EBacc entry among their disadvantaged pupils showed little or 
no increase in the percentage achieving both English and maths.  
 
While demonstrating the benefits of moving to a curriculum based on EBacc subjects, the Sutton Trust 
research also concluded that the EBacc is inappropriate for up to 30% of pupils.65 This brings into 
question the wisdom of the 90% target for entry, and also raises issues about the provision of suitable 
routes for such pupils. 
 
 
Comparing outcomes for disadvantaged pupils with those who are not disadvantaged  
 
There is a strong correlation between the outcomes for disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged pupils.  In 
most chains the attainment gap between these two groups is smaller than the national average. This 
pattern has been consistent over the five years of this analysis. Of course, as we have shown, this may 
be explained by the large numbers and relatively low performance of those pupils not classified as 
disadvantaged within these chains, but who would be broadly considered working class.  It is important 
to bear in mind that the socio-economic status of the ‘non-disadvantaged’ group varies significantly 
between localities and schools, and in the more deprived areas where sponsored academies tend to be 
located, they are often only a little better off than those classed as ‘disadvantaged’.   
 
Figure 6 shows that two-thirds of the analysis group chains are below the national figures for Attainment 
8 for both groups, and a further fifth are above for disadvantaged pupils but not for the other pupils.  
Only eight chains achieved Attainment 8 scores above the national average for their pupils who are not 
disadvantaged. 
                                                
65 Allen & Thomson, 2016. 
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Figure 6: Attainment 8 score for disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged pupils, 2017  
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The equivalent figures for progress are more encouraging; in half the chains, disadvantaged pupils have 
made better progress than the national average, and in 43% this is the case for non-disadvantaged 
pupils.  
 
 
Which chains were most effective for disadvantaged pupils in 2017? 
 
As in our previous reports, we have created a single overall measure of the attainment of disadvantaged 
pupils, which combines measures of both attainment and progress. This year the components of our 
summary measure are the same as last year: 
 
• average Attainment 8 score; 
• Progress 8 score; 
• percentage achieving a standard pass or above in both English and mathematics. 
 
These are all headline accountability measures in the system implemented for the first time in 2016. 
We have not included the other headline measures: EBacc entry and achievement. Our concern is with 
attainment rather than exam entries, and for a pupil, we believe that achieving Grade C or above in 
mathematics and English is more important for future education and employment than achieving EBacc 
(which in any case includes these subjects).  
 
Each chain’s summary score has then been calculated using the difference between the chain and all 
mainstream schools for each of the above measures, with each of these measures given equal weight. 
Table 5 shows the chains performing above and below the average for mainstream schools in this 
weighted attainment measure. Within each band chains are listed in alphabetical order.  
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Table 5: Chains performing above and below the mainstream average on key measures of 
attainment for disadvantaged pupils in 2017 
 
 Progress 8 Attainment 8 
Standard pass 
(grades 9-4) in both 
English and maths % 
Overall rank 
Well 
above 
average 
City of London City of London City of London City of London 
Diocese of London Diocese of London Diocese of London 
Diocese of 
London 
Dixons Harris ARK Harris 
Harris ARK Dixons ARK 
Inspiration Dixons Harris Dixons 
Outwood Grange Grace Outwood Grange Inspiration 
Above 
average 
ARK Inspiration Sidney Stringer Outwood Grange 
Bridgwater Mercers Skinners' Priory 
Cambridge Meridian Outwood Grange United Learning Redhill 
CfBT Priory Aldridge Education Sidney Stringer 
Co-operative Redhill Emmanuel Skinners' 
Creative Education Sidney Stringer Haberdashers United Learning 
David Ross United Learning Inspiration CfBT 
Delta CfBT Landau Forte David Ross 
Diocese of Oxford Haberdashers Priory E-ACT 
E-ACT Landau Forte Redhill Grace 
Grace Ormiston Ac. Transformation Haberdashers 
Landau Forte Skinners' AET Landau Forte 
Ormiston Ac. Transformation Aspirations Mercers 
Priory AET Bridgwater Ormiston 
Redhill Aldridge Education Brook 
Ac. 
Transformation 
Sidney Stringer Aspirations Brooke Weston AET 
Skinners' Bridgwater Cabot 
Aldridge 
Education 
United Learning Bright Futures Cambridge Meridian Aspirations 
White Rose Brook CfBT Bridgwater 
Average 
Ac. Transformation Brooke Weston Co-operative Bright Futures 
Cabot Cabot David Ross Brook 
Education Fellowship Cambridge Meridian Delta Brooke Weston 
Mercers Co-operative Diocese of Exeter Cabot 
Oasis Creative Education Diocese of Oxford 
Cambridge 
Meridian 
University of Brighton David Ross Diverse Co-operative 
Below 
average 
AET Delta E-ACT 
Creative 
Education 
Aldridge Education Diocese of Exeter Education Fellowship Delta 
Aspirations Diocese of Oxford Fylde Coast Diocese of Exeter 
Bright Futures Diverse Grace Diocese of Oxford 
Brooke Weston E-ACT Greenwood Diverse 
Diverse Education Fellowship Leigh 
Education 
Fellowship 
Fylde Coast Emmanuel Mercers Emmanuel 
Greenwood Fylde Coast Merchant Venturers Fylde Coast 
TKAT Greenwood Northern Greenwood 
Leigh Leigh Oasis Leigh 
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Merchant Venturers Merchant Venturers Ormiston 
Merchant 
Venturers 
Northern Northern RSA Northern 
RSA Oasis Swale Oasis 
Swale RSA TKAT RSA 
Haberdashers Swale UCAT Swale 
TEN TKAT University of Brighton TKAT 
Well 
below 
average 
Brook Trust in Learning Woodard 
University of 
Brighton 
David Meller University of Brighton Bright Futures White Rose 
Diocese of Exeter White Rose Creative Education Woodard 
Eastern Woodard David Meller David Meller 
Emmanuel David Meller Eastern Eastern 
Midland Eastern Midland Midland 
Tapton Midland Tapton Tapton 
Trust in Learning Tapton TEN TEN 
UCAT TEN Trust in Learning Trust in Learning 
Wakefield UCAT Wakefield UCAT 
Woodard Wakefield White Rose Wakefield 
 
Note: Top tier: Well above average (greater than 1.0 Standard Deviations better attainment than mainstream), second tier: above 
average (0.1 to 1.0 SDs better); third tier: average (within 0.10 SDs of mainstream); fourth tier: below average (-0.10 & -1.0 SDs 
worse); bottom tier: well below average (less than -1.0 SDs worse improvement than mainstream). Within categories chains are in 
alphabetical order.  
 
Table 5 shows that in comparison to the mainstream school average, the analysis group academies are 
more successful on the Progress 8 measure than on Attainment 8 or achieving standard passes in English 
and maths GCSE. This reflects the fact that the vast majority have above average percentages of pupils 
with low prior attainment.  
 
The table also demonstrates, as in previous years, the sharply differentiated quality of outcomes achieved 
by chains for their disadvantaged pupils, indicating strongly differentiated provision at either end of the 
scale. In 2017 just two chains (both in London: City of London and Diocese of London) were ‘well above 
average’ in all four measures. A further six were ‘above average’ or ‘well above’ for all measures: Harris, 
Dixons, Outward Grange, ARK, Sidney Stringer, and United Learning. At the other end of the scale, the 
‘below average’ group is much larger, and five chains are ‘well below average’ on each measure (David 
Meller, Eastern, Midland, Tapton, and Wakefield).  
 
This overall measure of attainment also enables us to review changes in ranking over the five years; we 
do this in Section 6 of this report. 
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6. Changes in performance 2013-2017 
In this section, we review how the analysis group academies have performed over the five years in which 
we have been conducting this analysis, considering first overall performance – Ofsted grades and 
performance against the floor standard – and then the attainment of disadvantaged pupils using the 
overall measure as on Table 5. We then draw together other key findings from our previous reports. 
 
 
Ofsted and the floor standard  
 
In our reports, we have reviewed how the analysis group of sponsored academies performed in their most 
recent Ofsted inspections (though we are aware that in some cases these took place some years earlier). 
The latest results available in August 2017 showed that a third of the analysis group chains had one or 
more schools that were judged to be Inadequate, and therefore vulnerable to re-brokering.  
 
Figure 7 shows outcomes for the analysis group in comparison to the national pattern over the years 
2014-17. 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of secondary schools judged Inadequate or Requires Improvement in 
the analysis group and nationally, 2014 -17 
 
a) Includes all chains in the analysis group b) Includes only the 26 chains in the group throughout 
the period   
  
Figure 7a shows that in comparison with all secondary schools, a higher proportion of analysis group 
academies were judged as Requires Improvement or Inadequate (using the most recent inspection 
grades). While the proportion in these categories decreased between 2014 and 2017, the gap between 
the analysis group and the national figures remains very much the same. However, these figures include 
chains are no longer part of the group, and new entrants. Figure 7b uses only the 26 chains that were 
in the analysis group throughout the period (though the number of sponsored secondary academies in 
these chains that were included in the group increased from 135 to 196). This group shows a widening 
of the gap between 2014 and 2016 and a narrowing in the final year.  
 
We have also reviewed the percentage of schools below the government’s floor standards. Here it is 
important to note that the floor standard, originally based on percentage of 5 A*-C GCSEs including 
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English and maths, changed in 2016, and is now based on pupil progress as shown by Progress 8. We 
would expect this to favour sponsored academies which as we have shown, tend to show good pupil 
progress, but low attainment (reflecting the proportion of pupils with low primary school attainment). 
 
Figure 8: Percentage of secondary schools below the floor standard in the  
analysis group and nationally, 2014 -17 
 
a) Includes all chains in the analysis group b) includes only the 26 chains in the 
analysis group throughout the 
period   
  
 
Figure 8a, using all the chains in the group each year, shows that the proportion of academies below 
the floor standard in the analysis group was higher than the national figure each year, but that the gap 
between the two groups has narrowed, which is encouraging. Nevertheless, in 2017, 25 out of 58 
analysis group chains had at least one school below floor.  
 
Figure 8b, based on only the 26 chains that were in the analysis group throughout the period, is even 
more encouraging, since in 2017 the percentage of schools below floor was less than the national figure.  
Possible reasons for this will be discussed in the section that follows. 
 
Both Figure 8a and 8b show that the analysis group academies benefited substantially from the new 
floor standard methodology introduced in 2016, based on pupil progress. As Figure 3 showed, more 
chains have above average pupil progress than have above average attainment. 
 
 
Changes in the performance of the analysis group academy chains 2013-17 
 
The changes to the exams taken, the way they are graded, and the key performance indicators make it 
impossible to compare standards over time. However, we can review how results for one group compare 
with another and how this has changed. Figure 9 below shows the performance of disadvantaged pupils 
in our analysis group of academies in comparison with pupils in all mainstream schools. From 2013-
2016, it uses the percentage of pupils achieving 5 A*-C GCSEs at Grade C or above including English 
and maths (5A*CEM). For 2016 and 2017, Attainment 8 scores are shown. Note that for 2016 we show 
both measures.  
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Figure 9: Performance of disadvantaged pupils in analysis group academies compared with 
those in all mainstream schools  
 
Percentage achieving 5A*CEM Attainment 
8 score 
 
 
In 2013 the analysis group academies had a higher percentage of disadvantaged pupils achieving 
5A*CEM than the national figure for all mainstream schools. In 2014 there was little difference between 
these groups. From 2015 onwards, the analysis group performed less well than mainstream schools, 
though in 2017 the difference was less than it had been. The decrease in national Attainment 8 scores 
between 2016 and 2017 is explained by methodological changes in the way it is calculated, rather than 
poorer attainment;66 this suggests a relative improvement in Attainment 8 scores in the analysis group.  
A similar pattern emerges when we review the number of chains in our analysis performing above or 
below the mainstream average, using the overall attainment measure we developed. Figure 10a shows 
the percentage of chains that were above and below the mainstream average on that measure. It shows 
that in comparison with the national pattern, overall performance of disadvantaged pupils in analysis 
group chains declined between 2013 and 2016 but has improved in 2017.  
 
One possible reason for this pattern is that the number of chains in the analysis group has increased 
during this period (from 31 in 2013 to 58 in 2017) and the new entrants had lower performance. 
Therefore we have also reviewed the same figures using only the 26 chains which have consistently been 
in the analysis group.  This is shown in Figure 10b. The pattern is similar but less marked.  Further 
review shows that 78% of new chains entering the analysis group were below average in their first year, 
making the performance of the whole analysis group worse. This suggests that new academy trusts take 
time to establish themselves and find the most effective ways of improving performance.  
 
The pattern shown above (a relative decline in performance among analysis group academies between 
2013 and 2016) may also reflect the time it took for academy chains (and the schools in them) to adapt 
to changes in performance measures. The adjustment needed has been the least for schools which in 
the past have taught a strongly academic curriculum, and greatest for those which taught more 
vocational subjects. In our first report, we noted that in comparison to other types of school, sponsored 
academies entered far more of their pupils for vocational qualifications.  The extent to which this 
happened varied across chains. When the list of qualifications that were considered ‘equivalent’ to GCSE 
was pruned following the Wolf Report, sponsored academies had to make larger changes to their 
curriculum and staffing than other types of school, and this affected some chains more than others. 
                                                
66 DfE, 2018b. 
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Figure 10: Percentage of chains above and below the average figure on the overall 
attainment measure for all disadvantaged pupils 2013-17 
a) Percentage of all chains in the analysis group b) Percentage of 26 chains that were in the analysis group 
in all five years  
  
 
 
Similarly, the change in key performance measures from 5 A*-C grade GCSEs or equivalent including 
English and maths to Attainment 8 and Progress 8 meant that a considerable adjustment had to take 
place. Attainment 8 measures the achievement of a pupil across eight, mainly academic, qualifications 
(regardless of whether a GCSE pass is achieved or not). Progress 8 uses the same subjects. It thus 
becomes particularly important to enter pupils for exams in eight subjects that count towards this, even 
if their grades are low. This again required a substantial change in many sponsored academies which 
had not previously entered pupils for so many academic subjects. The position in high-performing 
schools with fewer disadvantaged pupils was rather different. They had always focused on academic 
subjects and so had to make few changes.  
 
 
Change over time in the relative ranking of academy chain performance 
 
Each year we have ranked all the chains in the analysis group in terms of their overall performance.  
Considering first the 26 chains that have been consistently part of the analysis group, we find that more 
than half the chains have stayed around the same position in the ranking throughout the five years. City 
of London, Harris, ARK and Outwood Grange have been consistently high in the ranking. Of later 
entrants, Diocese of London been also been consistently very high in our ranking. These chains vary in 
proportion of disadvantaged pupils, with City of London very high, and Outwood Grange only just above 
the national figure. They tend to be around average for pupils with low prior attainment, though Outwood 
Grange have more than the others.  Three of them are based in London, which has for some years had 
higher attainment than other parts of the country.  
 
Of the original 26 chains, the greatest improvement has been shown by Grace, moving from 25th to 8th 
in our ranking. Other improvers are Landau, Diocese of Oxford, United Learning and The Priory. Their 
improvement demonstrates what is possible, and we wish them well in maintaining their trajectory. 
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Woodard and AET have been near the bottom of the table for five years, as has Greenwood since 2014, 
together with later entrants, Midland and UCAT. SPTA was in a similar position but in 2017, rebranded 
as Delta, it has shown some improvement. A key factor here has been learning from a more successful 
trust; SPTA appointed a new CEO who had been deputy CEO of Outwood Grange, and entered into an 
agreement with that trust in relation to receiving support to improve performance. None of these chains 
is London-based, and while in terms of pupil intake most are more challenging than the highest achieving 
chains, they are not the chains with the highest levels of challenge. Woodard has fewer disadvantaged 
pupils than the national average.  
 
Some of the smaller chains have had very variable results. David Meller (with just two sponsored KS4 
academies) is an example, changing from below average to well above average and back to well below 
average. Similarly, Dixons was above average in 2013, dropped to below average the following year, but 
in 2017 is once again above average. It is inevitable that the performance of smaller chains will be 
particularly affected by changes in one of its schools (including staff changes, the quality of different 
pupil cohorts etc.)  
 
Within any trust, the performance of individual schools varies hugely,67 and when a trust takes on new 
schools these can have a substantial impact on the trust’s attainment figures, particularly if the trust is 
small. This is clearly a disincentive to taking on many under-performing schools. Similarly, when the 
lowest performing schools in a trust are re-brokered, this can improve the trust’s position in the league 
tables. Thus, changes in performance may not reflect any real changes in the schools involved.   
 
Moreover, there is inevitably a degree of ‘game-playing’ in efforts to improve performance figures. Some 
chains have used the fact that only pupils who are on the roll in January of Year 11 count towards the 
tables as an incentive to lose, or ‘off-roll’ pupils who would bring results down. A recent investigation by 
The Guardian showed that nationally, the number of pupils ‘off-rolled’ before they take their GCSE exams 
has risen and was 2% in 2018 (compared with just 0.1% seven years earlier). But the loss of students 
in some academy trusts was very much higher. Combining figures for the last two years, Harris and Delta 
(formerly SPTA), lost 7% of their pupils, and Aldridge and Inspiration also lost over 5%.68 They argue 
that this relates to their history and the nature of their pupil intake. Similarly, Ofsted report that 
academies, particularly those in some multi-academy trusts, appear to be losing proportionately more 
pupils than local authority schools, and that disadvantaged pupils are more likely to be off-rolled than 
their peers.69 Education Datalab have investigated various ways of reweighting the data to make all pupils 
count in some way, and have calculated how much this would change MATs’ Progress 8 scores, and 
show that this would reduce the Progress 8 scores of many MATs. If their suggestions were implemented, 
the greatest reductions in Progress 8 (over 0.1) would be experienced by Fylde Coast, Grace, Northern, 
Delta, as well as some chains which are consistently high in our ranking: Harris and Outwood Grange.70  
 
Another form of ‘game-playing’ involves the curriculum. We referred earlier to the previous substantial 
use of vocational qualifications in some chains. Arguably these were appropriate for the needs of their 
pupils, but at the same time the lesser degree of challenge undoubtedly helped raise performance 
figures. A recent instance of this sort of ‘game-playing’ involves the European Computer Driving Licence 
(ECDL). It was announced in March 2017 that the ECDL would no longer count in the school league 
tables from 2018 because it was not considered equivalent in challenge to a GCSE. MATs were far more 
                                                
67 See Nye, 2018b.  
68 Mansell, 2018 
69Bradbury, 2018.  
70 Nye and Thomson, 2018  
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likely to enter pupils for the ECDL than other schools; in some MATs, over 80% of pupils took this 
qualification. Analysis by Education Datalab shows that those trusts that had higher ECDL entry rates 
on average were more likely to have experienced falls in their P8 scores between 2017 and 2018.71 
 
In conclusion, then, the characteristics below are to varying degrees associated with chains with better 
results: 
 
• being longer established and having grown slowly; 
• having strong experience of strategies for improving schools; 
• only taking on schools that are exceptionally challenging when they have the capacity to support 
them;  
• having fewer pupils with low prior attainment; 
• having developed effective strategies to respond to national changes in the curriculum and in 
key performance indicators (some of which may involve ‘game-playing’); 
• learning from the strategies used in other trusts; 
• having a sustained mission and commitment to improving the education of disadvantaged pupils. 
 
 
Other key findings  
 
The impact of prior attainment  
  
The disadvantaged group includes a disproportionate number of pupils with low prior attainment (though 
only a quarter of all disadvantaged pupils have low prior attainment). Figure 2 showed that considerable 
variation between chains in the proportion of pupils with low prior attainment, ranging from 6% to 26%.  
The percentage of pupils with low prior attainment is strongly correlated with the level of KS4 
attainment. However, Progress 8 scores are based on prior attainment, and should eliminate differences 
in school intakes.  In our 2017 report, we showed that pupils with low prior attainment made slightly 
better progress in the analysis group sponsored academies than in other sponsored academies or in other 
mainstream schools. However, those with high prior attainment progressed less well in sponsored 
academies (including those in the analysis group) than in other types of school.  This pattern is shown 
in the national published figures for both 2016 and 2017.  
 
Converter academies in our analysis chains  
 
In 2017 we analysed outcomes for secondary converter academies in the chains in our analysis group. 
Just over a fifth of the chains had two or more converters that had been in the chain for three years. 
These academies on average had higher percentages of disadvantaged and of low-attaining pupils than 
the average for all converter academies. On average their attainment for disadvantaged and low-attaining 
pupils was similar to that of the sponsored academies. However, disadvantaged pupils with low prior 
attainment made better progress in sponsored academies than in converters, while those with high prior 
attainment made better progress in converters.  
 
 
 
                                                
71 Nye, 2018a. 
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Key Stage 2 
 
In 2017, we also investigated KS2 academies. Because of the widespread concerns about national tests 
at KS2, we did not use the writing test results (for which it has been argued that moderation was 
inconsistent across the country). Nor did we create an overall index. 
 
Whereas in secondary there were strong relationships between prior attainment and KS4 outcomes, this 
was less evident at KS2. At chain level, there was no relationship between percentage of low attaining 
disadvantaged pupils and outcomes for disadvantaged pupils. 
 
Where chains were included in both the KS4 and KS2 analysis groups, we are able to compare their 
success in the two age groups. Harris, Diocese of London and ARK were successful with disadvantaged 
pupils in both age groups. However, United Learning achieved weaker results in primary than secondary, 
and Northern did better in primary. Central Learning, which features only in the KS2 analysis group, 
was also very successful. 
 
At KS2, as at KS4, only about a quarter of the chains had enough converter academies to include in the 
analysis group. These converter academies had higher percentages of disadvantaged and low-attaining 
pupils than was average in converter academies. On average, attainment for disadvantaged pupils was 
slightly higher in the converters, but the picture across chains was much more varied.  
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7. Discussion  
So, nearly two decades since the opening of the first city academy, and five years since we started our 
series of Chain Effects reports, have academies achieved their intended mission of transforming the 
attainment of pupils from socially disadvantaged backgrounds?  
 
The data overall would clearly say not. However, there are several large caveats here. One is that – as we 
have repeatedly shown – there are a handful of academy chains that have provided exactly the 
transformational outcomes that were initially anticipated by policy-makers. The other caveat is that our 
analysis illuminates an often over-looked point – that academy chains are in the main providing for a 
disproportionately disadvantaged pupil demographic; in terms of pupil prior attainment as well as socio-
economic disadvantage. In this regard, academy chains have admirably stuck to their initial mission of 
addressing schooling in areas of social deprivation – but this also presents additional challenge in 
improvement. That this level of challenge was naively disregarded by policy-makers, is disappointing.  
 
Given the overall finding that the majority of academy chains are not securing better outcomes for their 
disadvantaged pupils, coupled with the scale of funding involved in academisation,72 and the on-going 
challenges with different layers and agencies necessary to regulate parallel systems, it would certainly 
be possible to cast academisation as an example of a ‘Blunder of our Government’.73 Critique is boosted 
by the point that the exclusive focus on school structures has arguably resulted in a calamitous oversight 
of the importance of the quality of the teaching, including the recruitment and retention of the teacher 
workforce. We hardly need to point to the evidence that the quality of teaching has most impact on pupil 
outcomes,74 and that this is especially the case for disadvantaged pupils.75 
 
Nevertheless, structures and content of schooling are important. There is evidence that the structure of 
MATs can enable them to better retain teachers and to deploy teachers into disadvantaged schools that 
need them. 76 It is arguable that the small number of very successful academy chains regularly 
highlighted in our reports demonstrate what is possible. We continue to find it perplexing that the 
Government has done so little to explore the methods of these successful chains and to distil learning 
to support other chains. We continue to call for this, and to call for the Government to drop its ideological 
stance in order to capitalise on the successes of a range of schooling organisations, whether MATs or 
Local Authorities.  
 
Turning to our specific findings. What we notice from our data over time is several-fold: 
 
• Some chains are realising the transformative vision envisaged at the start of the academies 
programme. Although growing slightly in number over time, these remain a very small minority 
overall.  
• Meanwhile, academy chains overall underperform the mainstream average for their disadvantaged 
pupils (and indeed for their non-disadvantaged pupils). While some chains have improved, and 
others may still do so, a significant number have sat at the bottom of our league table across a 
range of measures, over the five years of our analysis. 
 
                                                
72 Academies Commission, 2013. 
73 King & Crewe, 2014. 
74 Coe et al, 2014. 
75 Aiscow, 2010. 
76 Worth, 2017. 
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• In spite of this somewhat disappointing overall performance, it remains the case that academy 
chains are focused on providing for relatively deprived communities: the mission of academy 
sponsorship has been maintained. 
• Yet, conversely, some of the academy chains in the analysis group have also responded to 
government accountability and incentives in ways which are arguably not necessarily in their 
disadvantaged students’ interests. This would include entering pupils into all EBacc subjects 
even when they are unlikely to achieve standard level passes, as well as more dubious strategies 
such as off-rolling. 
 
This last point reflects the wider context within which the academy chains are operating. Accountability 
measures and Ofsted inspections are a much greater threat for the schools which are least likely to meet 
the targets set, and so it is obviously tempting to focus on targets even when this may lead to action 
which is not beneficial for individuals. Off-rolling is clearly not beneficial for individual pupils. EBacc 
entry is more debatable.  
 
We are aware of the evidence that a knowledge-based curriculum is related to higher remuneration post-
school, as well as to access to high status educational and career routes.77 We support Wolf’s analysis 
that equivalent qualifications were often disadvantaging pupils who need a broad and balanced 
curriculum and credentials that have credibility with employers.78 The Sutton Trust research on schools 
that changed their curriculum rapidly when EBacc was first introduced has shown that the disadvantaged 
pupils in these schools benefited.79 But at the same time, we are aware that the contrast between EBacc 
entry rates and EBacc passes in some chains means that the majority of pupils failed to achieve a 
standard pass in at least one EBacc subject, and possibly more, and we have shown that in some chains 
high EBacc entry is resulting in a high proportion of grades below a standard pass. The latter cannot be 
in the interest of pupils. In contrast it seems other chains (and we used Outwood Grange as an example) 
are apparently showing far greater awareness of their pupils’ exam potential in their exam entry and 
(closely related) outcomes, and achieving higher numbers of EBacc passes for their disadvantaged pupils 
in the process, than are those that enter far higher numbers for the EBacc.  
 
When pupils believe they have failed, this affects their self-esteem and self-confidence, qualities that 
are very much needed the adult world80  – in addition to the material impact that loss of GCSE credentials 
makes to pupils’ future employability, further educational access, and so on. The Sutton Trust research 
reported that despite the positive outcomes of the shift to EBacc, the headteachers involved believed 
that it would not be a suitable curriculum for up to 30% of their pupils. Thus the government decision 
to set a 90% target for EBacc entry, and to make EBacc entry an accountability measure, is at least 
questionable. We believe that the current emphasis on EBacc entry is unnecessary: Attainment 8 and 
Progress 8 offer sufficient incentive to encourage schools to offer all their pupils a broad and balanced 
curriculum that has academic depth, but also allows individuals to follow their preferences and aptitudes 
(including the possible inclusion of a limited number of vocational qualifications). There is no need for 
a narrower stipulation beyond this. 
 
Academy chains have been faced with many challenges over the last few years. The move to use pupil 
progress as the key measure of performance has been beneficial, with fewer of the analysis group 
academies schools falling below the floor target. But at the same time, the chains have been expected 
to take on more schools that been judged Inadequate and need a great deal of support to improve. They 
                                                
77 Ianelli 2013.  
78 Wolf, 2012. 
79 Allen & Thomson, 2016. 
80 Hutchings, 2015. 
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have also had to move to a more academic and challenging curriculum. This change has been very much 
more challenging in schools with a high proportion of disadvantaged pupils where a more vocational 
curriculum was in place, and has had implications for staffing and resources. These new demands have 
come at a time when school funding levels have been reduced, and there are shortages of teachers in 
some academic subjects – particularly maths, science and languages. It would be helpful if there was 
now a period of stability.  
 
It is also urgent to recruit more teachers in the secondary subjects suffering shortages, and to find ways 
of making teaching in schools in deprived areas more attractive. The accountability system is currently 
perceived to be skewed in favour of schools with more affluent intakes where it is much easier to achieve 
the required levels of performance.81 Those working in schools in areas of deprivation, which face much 
greater challenges, tend to feel threatened. This does not make working in such schools an attractive 
proposition. There needs to be a greater level of recognition of the challenges involved. 
  
We have consistently stressed the need for weaker academy chains to learn from those that are more 
effective, and for RSCs to ensure that MATs have effective school improvement strategies. But we also 
believe that there are wider changes (concerning, for example, accountability measures, curriculum, 
teacher recruitment and retention) that are needed to enable chains to do a better job. 
 
Our recommendations are at the front of the report. We hope they will be heeded in refocusing energy 
on delivering the best from groups of academies, for the benefit of their disadvantaged pupils. 
 
 
 
                                                
81 Schools with a higher proportion of disadvantaged pupils are more likely to be judged by Ofsted as Requires Improvement or 
Inadequate. See Thomson, 2018.  
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Appendix A:  Key performance measures 
 
EBacc is the most demanding of the accountability measures. To achieve the EBacc a pupil must gain 
standard or strong passes at GCSE in five core academic subject areas: English, mathematics, history 
or geography, the sciences and a language.  
 
Attainment 8 is based on pupils’ average attainment (whether or not a C grade is achieved) across eight 
subjects. These include the five EBacc subjects, and three further subjects, which can be from those 
specified for EBacc or can be any other approved, high-value arts, academic, or vocational 
qualifications.82  
 
Progress 8 is the most important measure in terms of accountability, since it is used for the floor 
standard. It is based on the same subjects as Attainment 8, but measures pupil progress between KS2 
and KS4, using a pupil’s KS2 results in English and mathematics as a baseline. It is calculated by 
comparing the Attainment 8 score of each pupil with the average score of all pupils nationally who had 
the same attainment level at KS2. Thus, the greater the Progress 8 score, the greater progress made in 
comparison with pupils with similar KS2 attainment.  
 
 
                                                
82 The DfE (2017c) report a strong correlation (correlation coefficient 0.90) at Local Authority level between average 
Attainment 8 scores and the previous key measure of attainment, percentage achieving 5 A*-C grades at GCSE or 
equivalent.  
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